Following the 2011 wave of political unrest, going from the Arab Spring to UK riots, the formation of a large consensus around Internet censorship is underway.
It's time we heard a little bit less about the economic and sociological justifications for what is in my view nothing less than wanton criminality.
Boris Johnson, Mayor of London, Clapham, 9th August 2011.
We are not social scientists. We have to deal with urgent situations. Paul McKeever, Police Federation Chairman, SkyNews, 11th August 2011.
Nowadays sabotaging the social machine with any real effect involves reappropriating and reinventing the ways of interrupting its networks.
The The best approach is a more innovative one, relying on agent-based social simulation. This methodology compares alternative computer-generated socially-consistent scenarios to detect and assess variables coming into play within specific social processes 4 . One of these variables is the use of social media to organize flash-mobs in order to build field-awareness in urban uprising settings.
This paper aims to show that the decision to repress and censor social media in a situation of civil unrest -beyond all political consideration of consequences in terms of repression of net neutrality and freedom of expression -is suboptimal even as to its expected impact on civil violence. Basically it describes a society where there is only one type of social agent (represented by circles in figure 1 ). Of course this is clearly an oversimplification, but one which is functional to avoid political splits between insurgents and law-abiding citizens (or rather "looters" and "community heroes", in the rather crude carachterisation adopted by UK conservative milieus). Epstein's standard social agent is an idealtypical individual that can, according to his/her context of social interaction, adopt a violent style of expression of political dissent.
The agent's behaviour is influenced by several variables, the first one being his/her personal level of political dissatisfaction ("grievance", indicated by lighter or darker shades of green colour in figure 1 ). This can lead the agent to abandon his/her state of quiet and become an active protester (red coloured circles in figure 1 ). However, the decision to act out -whether it is to go on a looting spree or to engage in violent demonstrations -is conditioned by the agent's social surroundings ("neighbourhood" in the model's language). Does s/he detect the presence of police (blue triangles in figure 1) in the surroundings? If the answer to this question is no, s/he will act out.
If the answer is yes, another question is asked: is this police presence counterbalanced 5 A summary of these researches is contained in Amblard et al. (2010) .
by a sufficient number of actively protesting citizens? If the answer to this second question is yes, then the agent acts out. Sometimes, in an utterly random way, one of the active citizens gets caught by the police and is sent to jail for a given period of time (black circles in figure 1 ). Again, the apparent simplicity of this rule, is sadly consistent with the many episodes of arbitrary and "swift" justice triggered by the UK government adoption of a hard line in dealing with riot repression. Another variable (called "vision" by Epstein) turns out to be crucial. Vision is an individual agent's ability to scan his/her neighbourhood for signs of cops and/or active protesters. The higher the vision, the wider the agent's range.
What we have done in our version of the model, so to evaluate the tactical use of social media to create flash mobs deploied in a situation of civil violence, is to modify the consequences of "vision". If in the original simulation 7 , agents and police officers move to randomly chosen places within their vision range, in our model, a different 6 In this paper, tactical use of social media designates the adoption of informal and ad-hoc practices of electronic communication (mainly geolocative media, social networking, texting, and real-time computer conferencing) for the purpose of temporary political confrontation. Our defintion stems from (Garcia and Lovink, 1997) 7 We have relied on the version of the model that is presented in (Wilensky, 2004) , using the NetLogo package for social simulation (Wilensky, 1999) Our revised NetLogo code is provided in Appendix B. Different patterns of civil unrest over time are generated by different values of 8 Another option, suggested to us by an anonymous activist blogger from London, would be to introduce a rule according to which groups of rioters converge in areas where a high number of police officers are attacking isolated agents. This "police violence" rule might be introduced in a subsequent extension of the model, and would provide eyewitness-based structural validations of the model. 9 The choice of 1000 time steps aims to provide a sufficiently long time to observe the asymptotic behaviour of the model, and is consistent with the time horizon of many of the simulation runs featured in (Epstein, 2002) . The empirical interpretation of time steps (whether they would represent hours, days, or months) is not attempted here as it would require appropriate time series data. The last case, corresponding to perfect social agents' vision (and thus to no censorship at all) deserves a little more comment. Apparently this situation is characterised by incessant high-level outbursts of violence, with peak active levels that seem to be even more significant that in other cases. Yet, the average trend of violence over time (black fitting line) remains among the lowest. Moreover, if we want to measure the size of violent outbursts, their peak active level is not a sufficient measure. Looking at time intervals between outbursts, at the duration of outbursts, and at the level of "social peace" between outbursts, helps us discover that this scenario is actually the systemic optimum. In the absence of censorship, agents protest, sometimes violently, nevertheless they are able to return to significant levels of quiet (green line in figure   4 ), when social unrest is halted. This is the only scenario where active protest drops down to zero for extended and repeated periods of time (see Table 1 in Appendix A). Although this situatonin harmony with what Epstein described as "punctuated equilibrium" in his original model of civil violence -does not seem to match a complete and utter (and empirically unlikely) "social peace", it still corresponds to a state where citizens are free to voice their dissent on social media, to coordinate their efforts and act about it -albeit in confrontational ways -while still enjoying a higher level of quiet over time (see figure   5 ).
In the absence of online censorship, social agents have maximum vision (here, equal to 10). This corresponds to the lowest levels of civil violence over time. 
Some concluding remarks
It is not our role to pass judgments on politicians and police officers' disapproval of "sociological justifications" of the UK riots or on their dismissal of social sciences as -at best -a luxury one cannot afford in times of unrests. This shoot-first-ask-later stance, although perhaps moved by the best intentions, might lead to ill-advised policy choices, like in the case of Internet censorship that we have chosen to discuss here.
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